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Importing Western Style, Exporting Tragedy:
Changes in Indian Patent Law and
Their Impact on AIDS Treatment in Africa
By Pooja Van Dyck *
¶1

¶2

¶3

In March 2005, new patent laws were passed in India to comply with World Trade
Organization (WTO) regulations and, specifically, the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement. These patent laws convey protections that are
similar to a Western-style patent system. India’s role as a supplier of inexpensive generic
drugs to Africa gives its new laws impact far beyond the sub-continent. The new laws
will potentially limit the production and sale of inexpensive drugs treating acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) in Africa. The new system allows production of
generic first-generation drugs. However, it prevents the production of generic secondgeneration drugs, which are important to AIDS patients who have become resistant to
first-generation drugs.
The AIDS crisis in Africa is reaching mammoth proportions — 25.8 of the 40.3
million people infected worldwide live in sub-Saharan Africa. 1 Although India’s new
patent laws will likely have little positive impact on western pharmaceutical companies
because there is little to no profit in the parts of Africa that are serviced by Indian
pharmaceutical companies, the impact on the AIDS crisis in Africa has the potential to be
devastating. Therefore, these new laws produce tragic consequences with little benefit,
except possibly to India’s developing pharmaceutical industry.
This comment discusses the background and impacts of the new Indian patent law
system. The first section is a general introduction to the issue. The second section
outlines the current state of the AIDS crisis in Africa and India. Section three discusses
the background of international regulations and India’s changing patent system in
response. The fourth section discusses the impact on Indian pharmaceutical companies
and AIDS in Africa of the new patent laws and potential solutions. Finally, the last
section concludes with the prospects for the response to the AIDS crisis given the new
patent laws in India.

*

J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2007.
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS & World Health Organization, AIDS Epidemic
Update: December 2005, 3 (Dec. 2005), http://www.unaids.org/epi/2005/doc/EPIupdate2005_pdf_en/epiupdate2005_en.pdf.
1
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. GATT, WTO, TRIPS, and the Doha Declaration
¶4

¶5

¶6

In 1995, the WTO came into being through trade talks between the members of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 2 The GATT was an agreement
between countries to regulate trade between nations by reducing tariffs. 3 It had governed
international trade since the end of World War II. 4 However, GATT was not sufficient to
cover modern international trade, and therefore, the international community created the
WTO. The GATT is part of the WTOs framework, but the WTO also created processes
for problems that were not resolved under GATT. 5
The purpose of the WTO was to promote free trade, provide a forum to discuss new
and existing trade rules, review trade policies of each member state periodically, and
settle international trade disputes. 6 Members can bring disputes to the WTO when they
believe a country is violating the WTO rules. 7 If the complaining party prevails and the
country does not implement the WTOs recommendations, the WTO is authorized to
allow the imposition of sanctions on the violating country. 8
The WTO oversees international intellectual property through an agreement
entitled Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The TRIPS
agreement established a uniform intellectual property standard in member states.9 The
Council on TRIPS reviews the intellectual property laws of member states and
determines TRIPS compliance. The TRIPS agreement regulates how member countries
deal with international intellectual property in the following areas:
(1) application of basic principles of the trading system and other intellectual
property agreements;
(2) adequacy of protection of intellectual property agreements;
(3) internal enforcement of intellectual property rights;
(4) dispute resolution among WTO member states; and
(5) transitional arrangements for new member states. 10

¶7

A country joining the WTO must bring its intellectual property laws into
compliance with the TRIPS agreement. For example, a patented invention must be given

2

World Trade Organization, The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
World Trade Organization, What is the World Trade Organization?,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
7
World Trade Organization, WTO Agreements,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr03_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
8
Peggy B. Sherman & Ellwood F. Oakley, III, Pandemics and Panaceas: The World Trade
Organization’s Efforts to Balance Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to AIDS Drugs, 41 AM. BUS. L.J.
353, 377-78 (2004).
9
Id. at 361-62.
10
World Trade Organization, Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
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20 years of protection. 11 The end result is intellectual property protection in member
states that is uniform and that closely reflects the type of intellectual property protection
familiar in Western countries. 12 If a country fails to comply, a dispute case may be
brought and the WTO may sanction the failing country by allowing other countries to
impose duties, taxes, and tariffs. 13
¶8
The WTO regulations grant a certain amount of time to comply with TRIPS
depending on the state of development of each member country. Developed countries
have one year in which to comply. 14 Developing countries have five years and least
developed countries have 11 years. 15 However, if a developing country has to radically
alter its patent system because it provided no patent protection in a certain area, it has 10
years to make the change. 16
¶9
In 2001, some member countries of the WTO met in Doha, Qatar, to discuss the
intersection of patent rights with health crises. They issued the Declaration on TRIPS
and Public Health (Doha Declaration), which interpreted certain articles of TRIPS. 17 The
Doha Declaration stated that member countries had the right to issue compulsory licenses
during a public health crisis while also recognizing the importance of intellectual
property protection. 18 The Doha Declaration is an intervention mechanism whose
principle purpose is to lower the cost of critical drugs during a public health crisis.
Although the Doha Declaration is an interpretive statement and changes none of the
language of TRIPS, most countries have accepted its terms. 19
¶10
The Doha Agreement recognizes the rights of a member state to determine, under
the member state’s own definition, that a public health crisis exists. 20 It further allows
the member state to issue compulsory licenses to pharmaceutical companies to produce
patented drugs, without permission of the patent holder, where the patent holder does not
sell or sells at an unaffordable price the designated drug in the member state. 21 Some
compensation is given to the patent holder, but the amount is determined by the state
issuing the compulsory license. 22
¶11
Countries lacking the capability of manufacturing their own drugs for public health
Parallel
crises can employ parallel importation under the Doha Declaration. 23
importation allows a state to buy pharmaceuticals from a cheaper source outside the

11

Id. Another requirement of TRIPS is that patents will be enforced through the legal system somehow.
Id.
13
Sherman & Oakley, supra note 8, at 377-78.
14
See Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, supra note 10.
15
Id. This has been extended another 10 years for least developed countries to 2016.
16
Id.
17
World Trade Organization, Doha Declaration Explained,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
18
Id.
19
Sherman & Oakley, supra note 8, at 380.
20
World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
21
Sherman & Oakley, supra note 8, at 369.
22
See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 20. There is an obvious
conflict of interest when a country using compulsory licenses in order to reduce the price of drugs is
permitted to determine what compensation the patent holder will receive.
23
World Trade Organization, TRIPS and Public Health: the Situation in 2005,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/health_background_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
12
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country and market them in direct competition with the patent holder at a much lower
price. 24
¶12
The WTO regulations and TRIPS are the international agreements that regulate
intellectual property rights. These agreements require member states to change their
patent systems to conform. The Doha Declaration clarifies TRIPS to allow countries to
use compulsory licenses to combat health crises.
B. India’s Generic Drug Industry and New Patent Laws Passed in
Compliance with TRIPS
India joined the WTO at its formation in 1995. 25 However, at that time, India only
provided protection of process patents for medicines. 26 Process patents are patents that
protect the method of making something, rather than the object or substance itself. India
had set up a weak system of patent protection in 1970 in order to foster a domestic drug
industry. 27 Therefore, India needed to radically amend its patent system to protect
product patents and was given the 10-year compliance period ending in January 2005.
Because India only protected process patents, before 1995, pharmaceutical companies to
easily alter a step in the process and produce drugs without violating the patents. 28
Therefore, India had a flourishing generic drug industry because copying process-patent
drugs could be done within the law.
¶14
Today, this generic pharmaceutical industry produces inexpensive drugs for India
and Africa. For example, in Africa, generic AIDS drugs produced by Indian companies
are $20 per month, whereas non-generic drugs, produced by the patent holder or licensee,
are $395 per month. 29 This reduced cost makes AIDS drugs more widely available to
people in Africa. 30 However, in order to comply with TRIPS, India made a series of
changes to its patent system to protect product patents. These changes have the potential
to be detrimental to the response to the AIDS crisis in Africa.
¶15
The latest change to the Indian patent system was made in March 2005 and brought
India into full compliance with TRIPS. 31 The change allows Indian pharmaceutical
companies to continue to manufacture generic drugs that were in production prior to
1995, but prevents them from applying process changes to drugs that were patented after
1995. The new laws effectively shut down the Indian generic drug industry for all drugs
patented after 1995.
¶13

24

Sherman & Oakley, supra note 8, at 372-73. This phenomenon has recently been a controversial
subject in the U.S. with people ordering drugs from Canada where prices are much lower.
25
World Trade Organization, India and the WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/india_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
26
Although this sounds unusual, other countries did the same at the time. See Suresh Koshy, Note, The
Effects of TRIPs on Indian Patent Law: A Pharmaceutical Industry Perspective, 1 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
4, ¶ 14 (1995).
27
Sherman & Oakley, supra note 8, at 381.
28
See Koshy, supra note 26, ¶ 21.
29
Global, AIDS POL’Y LAW, Apr. 8, 2005.
30
Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis of WTO Action Regarding
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 IND. INT’L. & COMP.
L. REV. 613, 615 (2004).
31
Compliance also requires patents to be enforced; however, India’s legal system is slow and
backlogged. Therefore, enforcement of patents may be a problem despite the new patent laws.
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This prohibition has a special impact on AIDS treatment because of the nature of
the virus. A patient with AIDS can develop resistance to a course of treatment with firstgeneration drugs even when taken properly. 32 New drugs must then be developed to
respond to the mutated strains — the second- and third-generation drugs. It is this class
of drugs, developed and patented post-1995, that fall under the new Indian patent laws.
While the Indian process-pharmaceutical industry can continue its manufacture of firstgeneration drugs, patients who require second-generation therapy are forced to meet
much higher prices for these drugs, which are now protected from process changes
prohibited by the new Indian patent law that responds to TRIPS requirements. These
drugs can be up to 50 times more expensive. 33
II. AIDS: AFRICA AND INDIA

¶17

In Africa, AIDS is spreading at alarming rates. More people need drugs to live
with AIDS. In sub-Saharan Africa, the infection rate is 7.2 percent. 34 The next highest
infection rate of 1.6 percent is in the Caribbean. 35 Of the approximately 40.3 million
people living with AIDS worldwide, 25.8 million live in sub-Saharan Africa (this is
approximately two-thirds of all AIDS cases). 36 In 2005, there were approximately 3.1
million deaths worldwide from AIDS, with 2.4 million in Africa alone. 37 “At best one in
ten Africans … in need of antiretroviral treatment were receiving it in mid 2005.” 38
¶18
The United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS and the World Health Organization
stated that “sustained progress in the response against AIDS will only be attained by
intensifying HIV prevention and treatment simultaneously.” 39 Fifty-five percent of future
infections expected to occur until 2020 could be prevented with a prevention and
treatment plan. 40 The situation in Africa is dire, and world organizations are calling for
provision of more treatment to AIDS patients in Africa. 41 Any reduction in available
treatment would significantly impact people living with AIDS. Success of treatment
programs also depends on the availability of second-generation drugs.
¶19
AIDS in India is also a major problem. In 2003, 5.1 million people were living
with HIV in India and the numbers are increasing. 42 Approximately 12.6 percent of the
globally infected population resides in India. 43 These statistics show there is a need for
inexpensive AIDS drugs and the need is increasing.

32

Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, As WHO and UNAIDS Call For Global Treatment ScaleUp, MSF Asks: Where Will the Essential Drugs Come From? (Mar. 28, 2006), available at:
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/pr/2006/03-28-2006.cfm.
33
Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, People Not Getting Treatment They Need to Stay Alive
(Nov. 29, 2006), available at: http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/pr/2006/11-29-2006.cfm.
34
See Epidemic Update: December 2005, supra note 1, at 4.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 3.
37
Id. at 2.
38
Id. at 5.
39
Id. at 7.
40
See Epidemic Update: December 2005, supra note 1, at 7.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 33.
43
Id.
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III. INDIA’S PATENT SYSTEM, EARLY STAGES AND CHANGES TO COMPLY
WITH WTO AND TRIPS
¶20

This section discusses the Indian pharmaceutical industry and the evolution of the
Indian patent system from inception to recent changes for compliance with TRIPS. India
joined the WTO in 1995 and had to change many of its laws in order to comply with
WTO regulations, including TRIPS. This section also discusses the details of TRIPS and
the Doha Declaration. The new patent laws in India allow continued limited generic drug
production under certain circumstances in light of the Doha Declaration.
A. Early Development of India’s Patent System and
the Pharmaceutical Industry — Pre-WTO

¶21

India’s patent system began in 1856 with the granting of exclusive rights for a
period of 14 years. 44 India created its modern patent system in 1970 by passing the
Patents Act. 45 It granted patent protection for process patents and specifically excluded
product patents for medicine. 46 Granted patents conferred rights for a period of 14
years. 47 Further, the patent must have been worked within India to receive protection; 48 a
patent would not have been granted for a solely imported product. 49 The Patents Act
contains a section allowing a compulsory license for a “patented invention not available
to the public at a reasonable price.” 50 This section is in force today, potentially allowing
the Indian government to issue compulsory drug licenses for domestic health crises.
¶22
The Indian government created this patent system to cultivate a domestic
pharmaceutical industry. 51 At the time of passage, India had very high drug prices and
foreign companies owned most of the patents. 52 India created the protectionist system to
foster domestic industry, promote import substitution, and reduce prices. 53 This patent
system created a flourishing domestic generic pharmaceutical industry because drug
product patents were not allowed and patented processes could easily be altered, thereby
losing their patent protection.
¶23
As a result of this patent regime, India is currently a major exporter of generic
AIDS drugs to African countries suffering from the AIDS crisis. Not only did Indian
pharmaceutical companies benefit from Indian law during its developmental stages,
citizens of African countries benefited as well. Indian generic AIDS drugs were available
for $20 per month, whereas Western pharmaceutical companies charged $395 per

44

Government of India Office of the Controller General of Patents, History of the India Patent System,
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/history.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2006). This system was based on the British
Patent Law of 1852.
45
Id.
46
Koshy, supra note 26.
47
Id. at 8.
48
Id. at 10. “Worked” means the process must be implemented or used in India. Patents that were
“worked” in foreign countries did not garner patent protection.
49
Id.
50
The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970; India Code (1999), § 84(5), available at
http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/patAct1970-3-99.html.
51
Id. at 12.
52
Id.
53
Id.
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month. 54 Also, Indian companies were able to bring together various AIDS drugs, each
owned by a different Western pharmaceutical company, and combine them into one
pill. 55 This made taking the medication much easier, especially for those Africans who
are poor or uneducated.
B. TRIPS and the Doha Declaration
¶24

The TRIPS agreement was part of the original agreement establishing the WTO
and was signed in 1994. 56 It represented an acknowledgement of the importance of
protecting intellectual property and of the role intellectual property plays in furthering
economic development. 57 The international community and future WTO members
created TRIPS to reduce impediments to trade while considering the technological needs
of least-developed countries. 58
¶25
The TRIPS agreement requires certain patent protection for member states, such as
patent life of 20 years, equal treatment for all member states, and patent protection for
both processes and products. 59 However, TRIPS also provides exceptions to full
protection for patents. In article 27 of TRIPS, a government is allowed to exclude
inventions from full patent protection that protect human life or health. 60
¶26
Further, Article 31, titled “Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder,”
allows governments to grant compulsory licenses. 61 It states, “[w]here the law of a
Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of
the right holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized by the
government,” compulsory licenses may be granted according to certain provisions. 62 It
also requires notification to the patent holder, although this may be waived during
emergencies, 63 and compensation to the patent holder to be determined by the issuing
government. 64 However, products of such licenses must be used predominantly in the

54

See Global, supra note 29.
This was something Western pharmaceuticals had not done, probably because of the cost of
negotiating with all the patent owners.
56
World Trade Organization, Overview: the TRIPS Agreement,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
57
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit
Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments — Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81, 84 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
58
Id.
59
See Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, supra note 10.
60
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 57, art. 27.2 (“Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the
prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect public
order or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to
the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by
their law.”); see Nabila Ansari, International Patent Rights in a Post-Doha World, 11 CURRENTS: INT’L
TRADE L.J. 57 (2002).
61
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 57, art. 31.
62
Id. Although Article 31 does not use the term “compulsory licensing,” this is how it has been
interpreted. See Sara M. Ford, Comment, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPs Agreement:
Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 941 (2000); Susan V. Vaughan, Note, Compulsory
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Under TRIPS: What Standard of Compensation?, 25 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 87 (2001) (discussing compulsory licensing).
63
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 57, art. 31(b).
64
Id. art. 31(j).
55
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domestic market. 65 These articles were interpreted in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS
and Public Health to clarify the use of compulsory licenses during health crises.
¶27
The Declaration stated that the TRIPS agreement included flexibilities when it
comes to public health. 66 Those flexibilities were:
(a) In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law,
each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object
and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and
principles. (b) Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted. (c) Each
Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health
crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other
epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency. 67

Therefore, governments may grant compulsory licenses for public health problems they
determine are of “extreme urgency” or “national emergency,” in addition to the
recognized epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.
¶28
There has been some debate as to what constitutes an “extreme urgency” or
“national emergency,” but this subject is beyond the scope of this paper. The AIDS
epidemic is an internationally-recognized crisis. The Declaration left open for debate the
problem of countries that have little or no infrastructure to produce their own drugs under
compulsory licenses. Specifically, paragraph 6 of the Declaration stated:
We recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective
use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the
Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to
the General Council before the end of 2002. 68

¶29

In August 2003, in response to the open question in paragraph 6, the WTO agreed
on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health. 69 The WTO implemented a process by which least developed
countries could import generic drugs produced under compulsory licenses in other
countries. 70 The first step in this process was to determine whether the least developed
country had insufficient or no infrastructure to produce the drug. 71 Then, the process

65

Id. art. 31(f).
World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, ¶4,
WT/MIN(01)/Dec/2, (Nov. 14, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf.
67
Id. ¶5.
68
Id. ¶6.
69
World Trade Organization, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm.
70
Id.
71
Id. Annex.
66
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required the least developed country to issue a compulsory license and report expected
quantities to the Council for TRIPS. 72 Finally, the exporting country must issue a
compulsory license and produce only the reported quantities. 73
¶30
Therefore, under TRIPS and in light of the Doha Declaration, an exporting country,
like India, may continue to produce generic drugs under certain conditions. These
conditions are reasonable for stable importing governments; however there are some
African countries where the government does not have the stability or political will to go
through the process.
C. India Joins the WTO and Changes its Patent Laws
¶31

In 1995, India joined the WTO in order to enter the global marketplace. The WTO
encourages and protects trade between member states by limiting import bans and quotas,
reducing custom duties, and creating most-favored-nation treatment with other
members. 74 India began passing various amendments to the Patents Act to comply with
WTO regulations. In 1999, India passed the Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999. It allowed
patenting of inventions not worked in India, thereby creating patent protection for foreign
inventions. 75 It further clarified that patents granted an exclusive “right to sell and
distribute.” 76
¶32
The 1999 amendment created a separate category for pharmaceutical patents called
Exclusive Marketing Rights. 77 This category allowed protection for new medicines, but
exempted drugs that were already in the public domain of India. 78 The amendment
created a “mail box” for applications. This “mail box” would put a hold on all product
patent applications from 1995 to 2005. After 2005, India would process the “mail box”
product patents in compliance with TRIPS. This was an interim measure enacted to
confer full patent protection to drugs invented after 1995 while India modified its patent
system. In 2002, India passed the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002. It extended the
patent grant from 14 years to 20 years and reflected other changes to the Indian patent
system as required when it joined the Patent Cooperation Treaty. 79 It also clarified the
ability to patent biochemical and biological processes. 80
¶33
The last amendment to the Indian Patents Act was passed in 2005. This
amendment finally removed the language prohibiting medicine product patents and the
special category of Exclusive Marketing Rights for medicine patents created in the 1999
amendment. 81 This amendment ended the “mail box” system because drugs could now
receive product patents. The amendment also included language about compulsory
72

Id. ¶2.
Id.
74
World Trade Organization, Principles of the Trading System,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
75
The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 17 of 1999; India Code (1999), available at
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patact_99.PDF.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 38 of 2002; India Code (2002), available at
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patentg.pdf.
80
Id.
81
Id.
73
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licensing for export. 82 This compulsory licensing section mimicked the language adopted
by the WTO in August 2003 in the Doha Declaration.83 These amendments brought
India’s patent system into compliance with TRIPS.
¶34
India’s pharmaceutical industry flourished under the previous weak patent system;
however, it had been limited to a generic pharmaceutical industry for the very same
reason. The industry could not only evade the process patents legally, it also did not have
to worry about being sued for violating patents because of the laws and the sluggishness
of the Indian legal system. 84
¶35
Today, India’s domestic pharmaceutical industry controls most of the domestic
market and its generic drug industry is a global competitor. 85 Some of its facilities are
inspected by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and it exports drugs to the U.S. and
Canada. 86 However, Indian pharmaceutical companies have not invested in research and
development because of the lax patent system. 87 Therefore, the industry will take some
time before it can produce drugs of its own invention. But, given the new patent laws,
the high cost of drugs in the West could be lowered by outsourcing pharmaceutical
production to India because of its modern pharmaceutical facilities and inexpensive labor
force.
IV. THE FUTURE OF INDIA’S PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND AIDS IN AFRICA
¶36

This section discusses the impacts of the changes in the patent system and the
potential response to the problem. Section A describes the changes to the Indian
pharmaceutical industry and the AIDS crisis. Section B focuses on the process and
problems of supplying drugs to Africa through TRIPS. The industry can continue to
supply Africa until people require new, patented drugs. At that point, India must decide
whether to follow the process outlined in its laws and TRIPS to produce second
generation drugs. If India does not produce these drugs, the AIDS crisis in Africa may
worsen. Section C discusses alternative solutions to this problem.
A. Impacts of Changes in Patent Law

¶37

The current patent law system in India could endanger the export of AIDS drugs to
Africa. The current or first-generation AIDS drugs that India currently exports to Africa
were grandfathered-in by the amendments to the Patents Act. 88 This means Indian
generic pharmaceutical producers can continue to produce and export current generic
AIDS drugs to Africa with no bureaucracy involved. However, as people become
resistant to first-generation drugs, second generation drugs will not be as readily

82
The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005; India Code (2005), Sec. 92A, available at
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf.
83
See Id.; see also Implementation of Paragraph 6, supra note 69, ¶¶ 1, 2a.
84
Stephen Barnes, Note, Pharmaceutical Patents and TRIPS: A Comparison of India and South Africa,
91 KY. L.J. 911, 924 (2003).
85
Id.
86
Sreenivasarao Vepachedu & Martha M. Rumore, Patent Protection and the Pharmaceutical Industry
in the Indian Union, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Oct. 2004.
87
Barnes, supra note 84, at 926.
88
See Sherman & Oakley, supra note 8, at 387.
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available, or at all, because they have protection under the new system. The new patent
system requires substantial government intervention before an Indian pharmaceutical
company can export second-generation generic AIDS drugs to Africa.
¶38
The new patent system also creates incentives for Indian pharmaceutical companies
to invest in research and development because it now provides product protection to new
drugs. The Indian market is growing and will be a lucrative market for new drugs.
Further, Western pharmaceutical companies have not been focusing on diseases in India.
Therefore, Indian pharmaceutical companies can create new drugs in a growing market
and be assured of protection for their investment.
¶39
The changes in Indian patent law potentially affect the future of the AIDS crisis in
Africa. Although first generation generic drugs will still be available cheaply despite the
changes in the patent system, Indian pharmaceutical companies cannot produce second
generation drugs without substantial government intervention. African countries have the
legal right to produce generic drugs under compulsory licenses for their AIDS crises.
However, most of them do not have the resources to create a domestic generic
pharmaceutical industry; instead, these countries will have to resort to the cumbersome
TRIPS procedures.
B. Supplying Second-Generation Drugs to Africa Through the TRIPS Process
¶40

To request generic drugs from India, an African country must submit a report of the
type of drug and its quantity to the Council of TRIPS, establish that it has insufficient or
no manufacturing capabilities, and grant a compulsory license to a pharmaceutical
company. 89 Then, India has to grant its own compulsory license, produce only the
amounts requested, and label the product as produced as part of this request. 90 Further,
both exporting and importing countries have to compensate the patent holder. 91 The
importing African country must ensure that the drugs it receives through such requests
are not used for other purposes or exported to other countries. 92
¶41
Although this process sounds straightforward, there are problems with requiring a
poor country that cannot afford non-generic medicines to ensure that the medicine is not
exported. Countries with no manufacturing capabilities are unlikely to have the
infrastructure or resources to seal its borders. As of the date of this paper, no countries
have requested importation or exportation of drugs produced under compulsory licenses
through the TRIPS process. 93 Therefore, there is no evidence of whether the TRIPS
process is feasible for both importing and exporting countries.
¶42
Once India’s pharmaceutical companies begin competing on a global level with
patented drugs of their own, what incentives do they have to produce low-priced drugs
for Africa? Additionally, Indian pharmaceutical companies may not have the high profits
that Western companies do. Exporting new drugs to the lucrative Western market for
higher profits may use resources of Indian pharmaceutical companies that will no longer
be available to manufacture AIDS drugs for Africa. In addition, Indian companies may
89
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begin research and development on diseases found in India that are not researched by
Western companies. These new drugs may divert resources that could have been used to
produce generic AIDS drugs (e.g., manufacturing plants, workers, etc.).
Furthermore, working within the framework of the WTO would mean more
bureaucracy for the Indian government. Besides the problem of its slow-working nature
and miles of red-tape, the Indian government may be reluctant to issue compulsory
licenses because of the potential for dispute cases. In addition, the Indian government
may want to encourage foreign investment and may not be willing, from a political
standpoint, to use compulsory licenses for products from potential investors.
With respect to the African side of the equation, many African countries have
unstable or ruthless governments that may not follow the process laid out by the WTO.
People in these countries may continue to suffer even if drugs are available for people in
other countries whose governments are willing to use the TRIPS process. The WTO
process for exporting generic drugs does not seem to allow for non-governmental
organizations to request and distribute the drugs.
On the other hand, Indian pharmaceutical companies may choose to produce AIDS
drugs in violation of patents. Fear of the Indian legal system may not be much of a
deterrent to Indian companies because of the back-log and lengthy case time. 94
Therefore, Indian companies that are violating patents may be shielded from suit within
the country from Western pharmaceutical patent holders. Patent holders would have to
bring suit against the Indian government for violation of patents through the WTO
settlement process. This process requires the company’s home country government to
bring the suit to the WTO. For U.S. pharmaceutical companies, this means working with
different administrations with varying levels of interest in participating in international
institutions. 95
Therefore, continued Indian production of generic AIDS drugs is not a guaranteed
solution to the crisis in Africa.
C. Other Solutions to Africa’s AIDS Problem

¶47

If India stops producing AIDS drugs for Africa beyond the first-generation drugs,
the situation in Africa will further deteriorate unless another source emerges. Other
developing countries, including Brazil and South Africa, will soon face the same WTO
and TRIPS compliance issues currently faced by India. 96 However, South Africa, which
also has a large AIDS epidemic, may be more willing to use compulsory licensing.
China, in contrast, who has only recently joined the WTO, has more time to amend its
patent laws to comply with TRIPS. 97 Conceivably, China could pick up where India left
off until full compliance with TRIPS is required. However, this would present little more
than a stop-gap measure. African countries could manufacture the drugs themselves, but
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the countries most in need of the drugs also lack the infrastructure and capital to create a
highly technical industry.
Brazil has repeatedly used the threat of compulsory licensing to negotiate lower
prices for drugs with pharmaceutical companies. 98 Although this could be a valuable tool
for African countries, most of the countries lack the resources to make the threat credible.
However, threatening to use a compulsory license to import generic AIDS drugs may be
an effective means of negotiating lower prices with Western pharmaceutical companies.
One important caveat is that the drugs’ production costs are both more than an average
African country can afford and more than the price charged by Indian pharmaceutical
companies.
Another potential solution is for generic drug companies in India to continue
making drugs for specific African countries by obtaining licensing from patent holders at
a reduced cost. This type of arrangement would significantly reduce the costs of the
drugs because Indian pharmaceutical companies are able to access a cheaper labor force
and would not need to acquire the needed manufacturing technologies. Western
pharmaceuticals could license their patented drugs to an Indian generic company as part
of a public relations campaign to create access for Africans to AIDS drugs.
One problem with this solution is that multiple companies own the patents for
AIDS drugs. To make the drug cocktail necessary for AIDS treatment, Indian generic
companies would need licenses from many companies. Further, Western pharmaceutical
companies may be hesitant to license their patents for little to no cost because it creates a
precedent or because it would create another supply for their drug. Consumers in the
lucrative U.S. market may use the AIDS drugs as an example in the face of an epidemic
or threat to health, like anthrax or avian flu. In addition, Western pharmaceutical
companies may fear importation into the West from the Indian generic companies. 99
However, if the hurdles could be overcome, this plan would ensure a steady supply to
Africa.
Another possible outcome is that there are no new drugs available for poor Africans
with AIDS, a possibility that entails a further deterioration of the African situation.
However, the AIDS crisis is well known by most Westerners, and such a scenario would
likely prompt both public outcry and a response by foreign aid organizations. In addition,
Western pharmaceutical companies already have been increasing their help to African
countries by providing AIDS drugs at reduced or no cost, 100 a response partially
precipitated by the availability of generic drugs produced in India.101 However, no matter
how generous Western pharmaceutical companies may be, high production costs and
little or no return will threaten the sustainability of these programs. 102
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Even if Western pharmaceutical companies continue to offer price reductions on
AIDS drugs, many African countries may still be unable to afford them; however, Indian
companies could provide drugs below even the discounted Western rates and within
reach of African countries. 103 Furthermore, without the combination of a drug cocktail
into one pill, there is an increased chance of the patient developing resistance to AIDS
drugs because of the difficulty in maintaining the drug schedule. 104
¶53
Finally, much hope rests on an AIDS vaccine. Although this would be the best
solution for the AIDS epidemic, it does not exist today. 105 Hopefully, if a vaccine were to
be developed, it would be widely available to sub-Saharan Africans. A treatment that has
the potential to protect so many at-risk people is invaluable, but it should be produced
inexpensively so that African countries have a chance of obtaining it.
V. CONCLUSION
¶54

The potential for profits in selling AIDS drugs to Africa is minimal for Western
pharmaceutical companies. The ideal solution to the lack of inexpensive AIDS drugs in
Africa would be for Western patent owners to license their drugs to Indian generic drug
manufacturers for specific countries in Africa that are extremely poor and lack the ability
to work through the WTO. Indian companies can produce drugs more cheaply than
Western patent owners because of lower labor costs and the ability to combine the drugs
without fearing a suit for violating patents. The Indian government also does not fear
dispute cases being brought against it in the WTO. This solution seems unlikely because
of the amount of negotiation required between Indian pharmaceutical companies and the
many Western ones that hold the patents on the various AIDS drugs.
¶55
Therefore, the Indian government should work closely with African countries and
the WTO to use compulsory licensing to produce future AIDS drugs. The process to do
this is both in TRIPS and the amended Indian Patents Act. The only obstacle is the
incentive for the Indian government and pharmaceutical companies to continue to
produce generic AIDS drugs.
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